This lecture is organised by The Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School

The standard macroeconomic DSGE model used by economic policy and central bank planners cannot handle questions of fragility and stability because it assumes away complex market dynamics. A promising alternative approach replaces rational expectations with adaptive expectations and a public price system (one price per market) with a multidimensional private price system. Market equilibrium in this approach consists in 'almost-clearing' in all markets and a very small standard deviation of price in each market.

All welcome. For further information please go to https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/events/

About the speaker

Professor Herbert Gintis (Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard University, 1969) is External Professor, Santa Fe Institute, and Professor of Economics, Central European University. He and Professor Robert Boyd (Anthropology, UCLA) head a multidisciplinary research project that models such behaviors as empathy, reciprocity, insider/outsider behavior, vengefulness, and other observed human behaviors not well handled by the traditional model of the self-regarding agent. His web site, www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis, contains pertinent information. Professor Gintis published Game Theory Evolving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), and is coeditor, with Joe Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, and Ernst Fehr, of Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-scale Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and with Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr, Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: On the Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). He is currently completing a book with Professor Bowles entitled A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution.