This seminar is hosted by the Cabdyn Complexity Centre
Speaker: Dr Co-Pierre Georg, Interdisciplinary Group of Complex Systems, Department of Mathematics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Convenor: Felix Reed-Tsochas, Director, Oxford Martin Programme on Complexity
Abstract: This seminar proposes a dynamic multi-agent model of a banking system with central bank. Banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves according to their risk, return, and liquidity preferences. They are linked via interbank loans and face stochastic deposit supply. Evidence is provided that the central bank stabilizes interbank markets in the short-run only. Comparing different interbank network structures, it is shown that moneycenter networks are more stable than random networks. Systemic risk via contagion is compared to common shocks and it is shown that both forms of systemic risk require different optimal policy responses.
Venue: Seminar room A, Saïd Business School
Sandwiches and drinks will be provided