Dr Barbro Fröding, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
Abstract: In this talk the self-regarding aspects of a number of so-called other-regarding character virtues will be examined and the common assumption that the character virtues can be divided into two groups (one consisting of other-regarding virtues and one of self-regarding virtues) will be challenged. The other-regarding virtues are often said to focus on advancing the good of others whereas the self-regarding virtues primarily benefit the agent herself but in this talk it will be argued that virtues like philia, justice, beneficence and even temper, traditionally all seen as other-regarding, contain strong self-regarding aspects. The central claim is that these self-regarding aspects of the other-regarding virtues are necessary components of complete virtue - given the scope of these virtues, an agent has to act virtuously in her dealings both with herself and with others in order to qualify as fully virtuous. In order to illustrate the practical usefulness of applying virtue ethics to bioethics, a number of practical examples will be introduced.