We investigate how competing business interests shaped congressional voting on the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act of 2009. Merging establishment-level data with rollcall records, we find that districts with more carbon-intensive (“Brown”) firms were less likely to support ACES, while districts with more clean-tech (“Green”) firms showed higher support. Conservative representatives responded more strongly to local business interests, though mobilized public opinion could mitigate this effect. Using falsification tests and a Bartik-style instrument based on the shale-fracking boom, we demonstrate that our findings are robust and plausibly causal rather than coincidental.
Who Governs Climate Change? Business Interests and the American Clean Energy and Security Act
31 October 2025
Other Recent Journal Article / Working Papers
The environmental cost of welfare-driven policy changes in UK egg production
Dietary environmental impacts and quality differ by socio-demographic characteristics
Reduced meat and dairy consumption improves health, environmental and most nutritional outcomes without increasing diet costs among Scottish adults
Environmental damages of the top ten percent consumers exceed global climate and biodiversity funding gaps
Spatial Engineering of Gas Diffusion Layers Overcomes Mass Transport Limitations in Fuel Cells
Can knowledge reclassification accelerate technological innovation?